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Case No. 20081065-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Michael Willam Kissell, 
Petitioner/ Appellant, 
vs. 
State of Utah, 
Respondent/ Appellee. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his petition for post-
conviction relief. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-
103(2)(e) (Supp 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the post-conviction court err when it held that Kissell7s post-conviction 
petition was both untimely and procedurally barred? 
Standard of Review. The "underlying issue" in this case "is one of statutory 
interpretation, which we review for correctness, affording no deference to [the] 
lower court's legal determinations." State v. Yazzie, 2009 UT 14, \ 6,203 P.3d 984. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-35a-106 (Supp. 2006) and Utah Code Annotated 
§ 78-35a-107 (Supp. 2006) are determinative of this appeal and are attached as 
addenda to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 27, 2004, Kissell was charged with one count of forcible sexual 
abuse of a child, thirty-four counts of dealing in harmful material to a child, and one 
count of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. R. 69-87. Kissell subsequently 
pleaded guilty to five counts of dealing harmful material to a child; in exchange, the 
remaining charges were dropped. R. 93-98. On April 5,2005, Kissell was sentenced 
to five terms of 0-5 years in prison, and the trial court ordered the terms to run 
consecutively. R. 125-26. 
Kissell did not file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, nor did he appeal 
from his sentence. R. 6. Instead, Kissell's first challenge came on July 14, 2006, 
when Kissell filed a petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act 
(PCRA). R. 5-12. In his supporting memorandum, Kissell claimed that the trial 
court had violated his constitutional rights when it ordered the sentences to run 
consecutively. R. 13-28. 
The State moved to dismiss the petition for two reasons. R. 60-67. First, the 
State argued that the petition was barred by the statute of limitations; and second, 
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the State claimed that the petition was procedurally barred because Kissell could 
have raised these claims on direct appeal. R. 60-67. In his response, Kissell 
implicitly acknowledged that the petition was untimely, but nevertheless asked the 
court to excuse his late filing under the interests of justice exception to the PCRA's 
statute of limitations. R. 170-75. With respect to the State's procedural bar 
argument, Kissell argued that the court should review his claims due to unusual 
circumstances and the potential for an "obvious injustice." R. 175-78. 
The post-conviction court ruled that the petition was both time-barred and 
procedurally barred, and it then rejected Kissell's claim that any exception to those 
limitations applied. R. 189-91. The post-conviction court accordingly dismissed his 
petition. R. 189-91. Kissell appeals that dismissal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
On appeal, Kissell does not address the grounds for the post-conviction 
court's dismissal of his petition. Rather, he only addresses his underlying merits 
claim regarding the trial court's alleged errors at sentencing. But the court did not 
address the merits of Kissell's claims in its dismissal decision, instead resting solely 
on its conclusion that Kissell's petition was both untimely and procedurally barred. 
Insofar as Kissell has not challenged either of those rulings on appeal, the dismissal 




KISSELL HAS NOT CHALLENGED THE POST-CONVICTION 
COURTS BASIS FOR DISMISSING HIS PETITION 
Kissell claims that the trial court violated his constitutional rights when it 
ordered him to serve consecutive sentences. Aplt. Br. 11-28. This claim should be 
rejected, however, because it fails to challenge the actual basis for the post-
conviction court's decision to dismiss his petition. 
KisselFs petition was brought under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act 
(PCRA). See generally Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-101 to -405 (Supp. 2009). Under the 
PCR A, a petitioner is allowed to challenge a conviction or sentence after exhausting 
all other legal remedies. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-102 (Supp. 2009). A "petition for 
post-conviction relief 'is a collateral attack of a conviction and/or sentence and is 
not a substitute for direct appellate review/,, State v. Myers, 2004 UT 31, Tf 11, 94 
P.3d 211 (citation omitted). As such, a petitioner does not have an unlimited right to 
pursue post-conviction claims. Instead, petitions filed under the PCRA are subject 
to a number of statutorily-prescribed limitations. 
In this case, the trial court held that two particular PCRA limitations barred 
Kissell's claim. 
First, the trial court held that Kissell's claim was untimely under the PCRA's 
statute of limitations. R. 189-91. Under the statute of limitations in effect at the time 
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of this petition, Kissell was "only" entitled to relief under the PCRA "if the petition 
[was] filed within one year after the cause of action has accrued." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-35a-107(l) (Supp. 2006). In cases such as this one, where the petitioner did not 
file a direct appeal, the cause of action accrued on "the last day for filing an appeal." 
Id. § 78-35a-107(2)(a). 
Kissell was sentenced on April 5,2005. R. 125-26. Thus, the last day for filing 
an appeal was May 5, 2005. Utah R. App. P. 4(a). He therefore had until May 5, 
2006, to file his post-conviction petition. Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(2)(a) (Supp. 
2006). Kissell did not file his petition until July 14,2006, however, so the trial court 
correctly held that this petition was barred by the statute of limitations. R. 189-91. 
Second, the trial court also held that Kissell7s petition was procedurally 
barred. R. 189-91. Under the statute in effect at the time of this petition, a petitioner 
was "not eligible for relief... upon any ground that:... (c) could have been but was 
not raised at trial or on appeal." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(l) (Supp. 2006). This 
restriction exists "because a petition for post-conviction relief 'is a collateral attack of 
a conviction and/or sentence and is not a substitute for direct appellate review/" 
and it "'applies to all claims, including constitutional questions/" Myers, 2004 UT 
31, Tf 11 (citation omitted). 
In this case, Kissell could have challenged the legality of his sentence by filing 
a direct appeal. As he repeatedly acknowledged below, however, he did not appeal 
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his sentence. R. 6, 10, 165, 172. The trial court therefore correctly held that the 
petition was procedurally barred. R. 189-91. 
In his brief to this Court, Kisell does not acknowledge either ground for 
dismissal, let alone demonstrate that the trial court incorrectly applied these 
statutory restrictions in this case. Aplt. Br. 11-29. With respect to the statute of 
limitations, for example, Kissell does not claim that his petition should have been 
deemed timely through use of a tolling mechanism, nor does he renew his claim that 
the petition's untimeliness should have been excused under the interest of justice 
exception. With respect to the procedural bar, Kissell likewise fails to renew his 
claim that the good cause or unusual circumstances exceptions applied to this case, 
nor does he ever argue that the procedural bar was inapplicable because he could 
not have raised these claims below. 
Rather than addressing the grounds by which his petition was dismissed, 
Kissell instead simply argues that his sentence was constitutionally invalid. Aplt. 
Br. 11-29. As set forth in the PCRA, however, the PCRA is "the sole remedy for any 
person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and who has 
exhausted all other legal remedies." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-102 (Supp. 2009). And 
as set forth in the trial court's unchallenged ruling, Kissell7s petition was invalid 
under the PCRA because it was both untimely and procedurally barred. 
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Under Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, an appellant's brief 
must"contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial 
court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." 
As Utah courts have frequently reiterated, "a reviewing court is entitled to 
have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a 
depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and 
research." State v. Gomez, 2002 UT120, | 20,63 P.3d 72 (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 
P.2d 439,450 (Utah 1988) (in turn quoting Williamson v. Opsahl, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 
(111. App. Ct. 1981))). Thus, when the appellant fails to present any relevant 
authority, the reviewing court will "decline to find it for him." State v. Pritchett, 2003 
UT 24, f 12,69 P.3d 1278 (rejecting prosecutorial misconduct challenge). Similarly, 
"[w]hen a party fails to offer any meaningful analysis, [the court will] decline to 
reach the merits." State v. Garner, 2002 UT App 234, f 12,52 P.3d 467. An appellant 
must, in addition to citing cases, "explain why . . . the cases cited compel this court 
to reverse the district cour t . . . . " Id. 
Where, as here, an appellant fails to attack the basis of the judgment below, 
his argument is inadequately briefed and the judgment should be affirmed on that 
basis. Cf. State v. Sorenson, 2004 UT App 381U, at *1 (affirming where Sorenson 
failed to challenge two of three bases for trial court ruling: "Sorenson does not 
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challenge these determinations on appeal and, accordingly, we find no reason to 
reverse the trial court's denial of Sorenson's motion to suppress"); accord San Antonio 
Press, Inc. v. Custom Bilt Machinery, 852 S.W.12d 64,65 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) ("When a 
separate and independent ground that supports a judgment is not challenged on 
appeal, the appellate court must affirm"); James v. Phoenix Gen. Hosp., Inc., 744 P.2d 
689,694 (Ariz. 1986) (affirming judgment below on an uncontested issue); Shraederv. 
Eli Lily & Co., 639 N.E.2d 258,264 (Ind. 1994) (affirming judgment below "[bjecause 
appellants have not successfully challenged one of the independent grounds 
supporting summary judgment"). 
In short, Kissell was required to comply with the PCRA's requirements in 
order to obtain relief. The trial court ruled that Kissell had not done so, and Kissell 
has not challenged that ruling on appeal. As such, his appeal should be rejected. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the trial court's dismissal 
of this petition. 
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Respectfully submitted September 9 , 2009. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
R Y A N T ) / T E N N E Y 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Respondent 
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Addenda 
§ 78-35a-106 (Supp. 2006) Preclusion of relief-Exception 
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that: 
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion; 
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal; 
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal; 
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or 
could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for post-conviction 
relief; or 
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a 
basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if 
the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
§ 78~35a-107 (Supp. 2006) Statute of limitations for postconviction relief 
(1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year 
after the cause of action has accrued. 
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of the 
following dates: 
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of 
conviction, if no appeal is taken; 
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction over the 
case, if an appeal is taken; 
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court 
or the United States Supreme Court, if no petition for writ of certiorari is filed; 
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry of the 
decision on the petition for certiorari review, if a petition for writ of certiorari is 
filed; or 
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based. 
(3) If the court finds that the interests of justice require, a court may excuse a 
petitioner's failure to file within the time limitations. 
(4) Sections 77-19-8, 78-12-35, and 78-12-40 do not extend the limitations period 
established in this section. 
